Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press: viix. "The natural-Artificial Distinction and Conjoined Twins: a needed response to judith Thomson's Argument for Abortion Rights". National Catholic bioethics quarterly 6:4 (Winter 2006 671680 Schwarz,. The moral question of Abortion. Chicago: loyola University Press,. New York, cambridge University Press,. "living High and Letting die". Philosophy 76 (3 435-442 (2001) doi :.1017/S Steinbock,.
Washington, dc: Catholic University of America Press,. Lee, p and r george. "The Wrong of Abortion". In a cohen and c wellman, eds. Contemporary debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell: 1326, at 2021. The Ethics of Killing. New York: Oxford University Press. Rights, dubai restitution, and Risk.
Grand Rapids, mi: baker books,. A defense of Abortion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,. "The rights and Wrongs of Abortion". Philosophy and Public Affairs 2:2 (Winter 1973 117145. Jstor 2265137 Hershenov,. Social Theory and Practice 27:1 (January 2001 129148. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Abortion and Unborn Human Life.
The abortion debate - carl Sagan
14 Other common objections turn on the salon claim that the fetus is the pregnant woman's child, whereas the violinist is a stranger (the stranger versus offspring objection 15 or that abortion directly and intentionally kills the fetus, whereas unplugging the violinist merely lets him die. 15 Defenders of Thomson's argument 16 reply that the alleged disanalogies between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion do not matter, either because the factors that critics appeal to are not genuinely morally relevant, or because those factors are morally relevant but. Thomson's defenders also point to her 'people-seeds' argument as a strong analogy to typical cases of abortion. Thomson's article, by positing a moral justification for abortion even if one grants a fetal right to life, opened up a new avenue in the philosophical debate about the ethics of abortion. Critics of her view have formulated many objections to her argument, and defenders have responded in kind in a back and forth that continues in philosophy journals even now. See also edit.
G., Schwarz 1990, beckwith 19 on the pro-life side; tooley 1972, warren 1973, Steinbock 1992 and McMahan 2002 on the pro-choice side kamm 1992; boonin 2003: ch : vii thomson 1971: 4849. Thomson 1971: : 63; boonin 2003: 1331: : 52: : 54 a b c Thomson 1971: :134. Warren 1973; Steinbock 1992. Beckwith 1993; McMahan 2002 a. Schwarz 1990; Beckwith 1993; McMahan 20: 133281 References edit beckwith,.
This analogy raises the issue of whether all abortions are unjust killing. 11 caveats edit Thomson does not support unlimited abortion rights. She gives as an example a hypothetical woman who seeks a late-term abortion "just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad" and declares this to be "positively indecent". Thomson also explicitly rejects the claim that pregnant women have a right to kill their offspring. She argues for the right of the mother to stop being pregnant, even if this results in the death of the offspring, but not for the right to ensure that the offspring is dead.
If, for example, a late-term abortion accidentally results in the birth of a living baby, then Thomson would conclude that the mother has no right to kill the baby. Criticism edit Critics of Thomson's argument generally grant the permissibility of unplugging the violinist, but seek to block the inference that abortion is permissible by arguing that there are morally relevant differences between the violinist scenario and typical cases of abortion. One notable exception to this general agreement is Peter Singer, who says that, despite our intuitions, a utilitarian calculus implies that one is morally obliged to stay connected to the violinist. 12 The most common objection is that Thomson's violinist argument can justify abortion only in cases of rape. In the violinist scenario, the woman was kidnapped: she did not consent to having the violinist plugged in and she did nothing to cause the violinist to be plugged in, just as a woman who is pregnant due to rape did nothing to cause her. But in typical cases of abortion, the pregnant woman had intercourse voluntarily, and thus has either tacitly consented to allow the fetus to use her body (the tacit consent objection 13 or else has a duty to sustain the fetus because the woman herself caused.
M: a defense of Abortion (Cambridge
You dont want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions does thank happen, one of the screens is defective; and a seed drifts in and takes root. 11 Here, the people-seeds flying through the window represent conception, despite the precautionary mesh screen, which functions as contraception. The woman does not want a people-seed to root itself in her house, and so she even takes the measure to protect herself with the best mesh screens, and then voluntarily opens the windows. However, in the event that one people-seed finds its way mom through her window screens, unwelcome as it may be, does the simple fact that the woman knowingly risked such an occurrence when opening her window deny her the ability to rid her house of the. Thomson notes that some may argue the affirmative to this question, claiming that ".after all you could have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors". 11 But by this logic, she says, any woman could avoid pregnancy due to rape by simply having a hysterectomy an extreme procedure simply to safeguard against such a possibility. Thomson concludes that although there may be times when the fetus does have a right to the mother's body, certainly in most cases the fetus does not have a right to the mother's body.
But, Thomson says, the person threatened can intervene, by which justification a mother can rightfully abort. 8 Continuing, Thomson returns to the 'expanding child' example and points out: For what we have to keep in mind is that the mother and the unborn child are not like two tenants in a small house, which has, by unfortunate mistake, been rented. The essay fact that she does adds to the offensiveness of deducing that the mother can do nothing from the supposition that third parties can do nothing. But it does more than this: it casts a bright light on the supposition that third parties can do nothing. 9 If we say that no one may help the mother obtain an abortion, we fail to acknowledge the mothers right over her body (or property). Thomson says that we are not personally obligated to help the mother but this does not rule out the possibility that someone else may act. As Thomson reminds, the house belongs to the mother; similarly, the body which holds a fetus also belongs to the mother. 10 Pregnancy resulting from voluntary intercourse people-seeds edit to illustrate an example of pregnancy due to voluntary intercourse, thomson presents the 'people-seeds' situation: Again, suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may.
find yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child. I mean a very tiny house, and a rapidly growing child—you are already up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes youll be crushed to death. The child on the other hand wont be crushed to death; if nothing is done to stop him from growing hell be hurt, but in the end hell simply burst open the house and walk out a free man. 7 Thomson concedes that a third party indeed cannot make the choice to kill either the person being crushed or the child. However, this does not mean that the person being crushed cannot act in self-defense and attack the child to save his or her own life. To liken this to pregnancy, the mother can be thought to be the house, the fetus the growing-child. In such a case, the mothers life is being threatened, and the fetus is the one who threatens. Because for no reason should the mothers life be threatened, and also for no reason is the fetus threatening it, both are innocent, and thus no third party can intervene.
They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. If he is unplugged from you now, he will die; but in thank nine months he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you. 4, thomson says that you can now permissibly unplug yourself from the violinist even though this will cause his death: this is due to limits on the right to life, which does not include the right to use another person's body, and so by unplugging. "If you do allow him to go on using your kidneys, this is a kindness on your part, and not something he can claim from you as his due." 5 For the same reason, Thomson says, abortion does not violate the fetus's legitimate right. Thus, by choosing to terminate her pregnancy, thomson concludes that a pregnant woman does not normally violate the fetus's right to life, but merely withdraws its use of her own body, which usually causes the fetus to die. 6 Third-party participation the "expanding child" edit Thomson criticizes the common method of deducing a womans right to abort from the permissibility of a third party committing the abortion. In almost all instances, a womans right to abortion may hinge on the doctors willingness to perform. If the doctor refuses, then the woman is denied her right.
Life's Dominion : An Argument About, abortion
A defense of Abortion " is a moral philosophy paper by, judith Jarvis Thomson first published in 1971. Granting for the sake of argument that the fetus has a right to life, thomson uses thought experiments to argue that the fetus's right to life does not trump the pregnant woman's right to control her own body and its life-support functions, and that induced. Her argument has many critics on both sides of the abortion debate, 1 yet continues to receive defense. 2, thomson's imaginative examples and controversial conclusions have made "a defense of Abortion" perhaps "the most widely reprinted movie essay in all of contemporary philosophy ". 3, contents, overview of the essay edit. The violinist edit, in "a defense of Abortion Thomson grants for the sake of argument that the fetus has a right to life, but defends the permissibility of abortion by appeal to a thought experiment : you wake up in the morning and find yourself. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the society of Music lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help.