Smh: you have not explained the reason for Gen Akhtars obsession with Operation Gibraltar. CM: That is right but Gen Akhtar was a brilliant soldier and strategist who became obsessed with prematurely launching the operation, which resulted in disaster. Smh: When was it save launched and what was the chain of events? How come no one besides you opposed it? CM: neither the c-in-c army nor General Staff had the guts to stand up to the President, field Marshal ayub Khan, and tell him that his advisers in the ministry of Foreign Affairs supported by goc 12 division, akhtar Malik were taking him. The loser in the final analysis was pakistan, described by general. Arif in an analysis carried by daily dawn, 6th September 1990. How and why pakistan blundered into war7 At that time, the policy making in the country was highly personalized. The institutions were weak and by-passed.
Once he was dared by the bureaucrats that pakistan Army had done nothing for evernote pakistans creation or the liberation of Kashmir. At this Gen Akhtar spoke up that he had a plan and disclosed the rationale for Operation Gibraltar. The bureaucrats were reportedly quite taken in and the foreign Secretary aziz ahmad went and reported it to the foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The mercurial zab apparently met Gen Akhtar and then brought the matter to the ears of President ayub, who asked for a detailed briefing after he was purportedly convinced by Bhutto that the operation would resolve the kashmir issue, bringing India to the dialogue table. The briefing did take place at Murree amply illustrated by sand models and maps, with both President ayub and the Army c-in-c gen. Gen ayub gave his nod but asked why not Akhnur? Go for the jugular. General Akhtar responded: That too but I would need more troops and funds. The same was promised.
CM: As I mentioned earlier, there was no planning for providing them with logistic support, replenishment of arms, ammunition and food supply; providing them with shelter, shielding them from the Indian military and ultimately achieving their task. Smh: What was the response of ghq? CM: Initially i was pressurized to withdraw my observations and go along with the plan, when I did not budge;I was relieved of my command on 30th July and told to destroy all copies of my correspondence with ghq on the subject. Smh: What was the background of Gen Akhtars obsession with the. Operation Gibraltar and how did he get involved? CM: to the best of my knowledge, a number of bureaucrats from Rawalpindi used to go to murree for the weekend, where they would relax, play cards and chill out. Gen Akhtar, as goc 12 div, would at times attend these sessions.
Aphids on the world s Plants
CM: I was not going to let the matters rest there as it involved precious human lives. My commitment to my boys was more than just being their. After taking over from my predecessor Mitha Khan, i had changed the entire concept of their training and moulded them into a cohesive and professional unit. They had a role to play in the defence of pakistan but not to be led to the slaughter chambers on a foolhardy scheme. Undaunted by the rebuff at Murree and later at the ghq, i decided to put my arguments in writing, as to the reasons why gibraltar shall fail. My observations in brief, were:. No ground had been prepared before launching of the operation, in concert with people of the valley.
The raids essay were to be launched in total logistical vacuum relying exclusively of what the troops would carry in their packs or living off the countryside. Without any covert support across the ceasefire line, this living off the land proved fatal to the security of the guerrillas. (Most of them were betrayed.). Ghq had mixed up classic guerrilla operations with Commandos raids. All ssg and other officers, responsible for training and later leading groups across the ceasefire line were critical of the soundness of the plan, unsure of the means and uncertain essay of the end. Smh: What did you mean: unsure of the means and uncertain of the end?
He insisted that I depute some of my (SSG) officers for immediate training of his Mujahedeen. I had taken three of my officers with me for the briefing; I decided to leave them behind with General Akhtar and tasked them to do their best in the remaining four to six weeks. Smh: Did you brief the vcgs? CM: I rushed to the ghq, the same day and briefed the cgs and vcgs, who listened to me patiently. The result of my presentation however was barren of the result. Major General Malik sherBahadur (The cgs) posed only one question.
You (Mehdi) say that operation. Gibraltar as planned stands no chance of succeeding, but Akhtar Malik (goc 12 division) feels confident of its success. My reply to the Chief of the general Staff was that, the conflicting view point of Mehdi and Akhtar Malik notwithstanding, as Chief of General Staff of pakistan Army, he should also have an opinion on this important matter as we were not playing. Smh: What was his reaction? CM: to this date i remember the reaction of the cgs. He went red right up to his ears, and after a painful pause got up, extended his hand to shake and brought the interview to an end with the remarks that it is always interesting to listen to you! Smh: What steps did you take after the meeting?
Militaria mart is an online shopping centre and resource for
He responded that it was his plan. I then asked him, when homework he expected to launch the mujahedeen? When he said July, the same year, i nearly choked. I had initially assumed the plan to materialize in a year or two. I told him you will never get away with. The gocs briefing of the outline plan of Gibraltar operation left me stunned. The plan was so childish, so bizarre as essay to be unacceptable to logical, competent, professionally sound military persons anywhere in the world. I frankly told General Akhtar Malik that the Operation was a nonstarter and that I would render the same advice to the Chief and Vice Chief of General Staff.
Since most of the major players in this high stakes drama are no longer in this world to tell their side of the story, i have relied on relevant books, documents and articles available in archives and a series of interviews with Colonel syed Ghaffar. Besides Colonel Mehdi, i also had the opportunity to obtain the views of lieutenant General Lehrasab Khan (Retd who as a young lieutenant participated in the Operation Gibraltar and was able to provide invaluable first hand impressions of the situation and action, as he saw. During my various visits to colonel Mehdi, i found him not only eloquent and courteous, but the nonagenarian, despite his frail health, would get up to greet me and ensure that he would stroll till the gate to see me off; reminisces of rapidly receding. Here i reproduce some extracts resume from the interview: smh (myself When did you first find out about Operation Gibraltar? Mehdi (cm in late may 1965, i was directed by the vice Chief of General Staff, (late major General Abid Bilgrami) to go to murree and see goc 12 division, akhtar Hussain Malik. I listened to his briefing, which in a nutshell involved my ssg boys training a group of Mujahedeen, comprising regular army troops and volunteers, infiltrating them into ihk, creating a general uprising and bringing India to the conference table without provoking general war. I asked him whether the Army was on board.
indian military decided to undergo massive up-gradation of its arms and equipment. Some pakistani military and civil planners considered it an opportunity to take action in Kashmir before India completed the buildup of its military arsenal. Two developments acted as a catalyst to this thinking. The rann of Kutch episode in the summer of 1965, where Indian and pakistani forces clashed, with pakistan achieving an edge and the december 1963, disappearance of a holy relic from the hazratbal Shrine in Srinagar, created turmoil and intense Islamic feeling among Muslims. These factors bolstered pakistani commands thinking: that the use of covert methods followed by the threat of an all out war would force a resolution in Kashmir6. Evolution of the plan for Operation Gibraltar. The original plan for the Operation, codenamed Gibraltar, was prepared as early as the 1950s; however the conditions mentioned above, appear to have motivated pakistans Foreign Ministry, headed by its young, brash and ambitious Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the foreign Secretary aziz ahmad.
Liaquat Ali Khan took serious note of the japanese anomaly and sent a letter to lord Ismay through Chaudhry muhammad Ali. Ismay expostulated that the final report of Sir Cyril Radcliffe is not ready and therefore, i do not know what grounds you have for saying that Gurdaspur has been allotted to the east Punjab.3. India thus was enabled by lord mountbatten to have a direct access to kashmir and occupy it by force through a blatant Indian military invasion of Jammu and Kashmir on October 27, 1947, even though it had a majority muslim population. The maharaja of Kashmir acceded to India but the Indian forces had occupied Kashmir before the accession papers were signed.4. Pakistan sent its forces to aid the local Kashmiris liberate their homeland, resulting in the first Kashmir War. Pakistan managed to unfetter some portions of the valley but before success could be achieved, the Indian Prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru approached the United Nations, which had a cease fire promulgated; the fate of the kashmiris was to have been decided through a plebiscite, ensured. Conversely, mountbatten and Nehru reneged on their promises.
List of Compare and Contrast
Hali abstract (Operation Gibraltar was the code name given to the clandestine raids carried out in Indian-Held Kashmir (IHK) in July/August 1965, which became the immediate cause of the pakistan-India war in September 1965. The operation itself may have been bold and essays audacious in its planning but immature and unprofessional in execution, which resulted in needlessly sacrificing hundreds of pakistani soldiers, who remain unsung and unheralded. However, forty-one years later, it is still not too late to study the consequences of Operation Gibraltar, why it was an unmitigated disaster and to avoid recurrence of follies of this nature. Although if truth be told, had a bit of soul searching regarding Operation Gibraltar been carried out earlier, a fiasco like the kargil misadventure in 1999 could have been avoided and hundreds of honourable soldiers would still be in the service of their country rather. Initially pakistan even refused to accept the bodies of its slain soldiers2.- author). Background: Kashmir was an unfinished agenda of the partition plan of India. The boundary commission under its Chairman Sir Cyril Radcliffe, assigned the task to partition India, was heavily influenced by the viceroy lord. Sensing this prejudice, pakistans founding fathers, quaid-e-azam Muhammad Ali jinnah and liaquat Ali Khan concluded that the entire area of the muslim majority population of Gurdaspur was being awarded to India, providing them access to kashmir.